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Abstract
The use of open, Internet-based communications for business-to-business
(B2B) interactions requires accountability for and acknowledgment of
the actions of participants. Accountability and acknowledgment can be
achieved by the systematic maintenance of an irrefutable audit trail to
render the interaction non-repudiable. To safeguard the interests of each
party, the mechanisms used to meet this requirement should ensure fair-
ness. That is, misbehaviour should not disadvantage well-behaved par-
ties. Despite the fact that Web services are increasingly used to enable
B2B interactions, there is currently no systematic support to deliver such
guarantees. This paper introduces a flexible framework to support fair
non-repudiable B2B interactions based on a trusted delivery agent. A
Web services implementation is presented. The role of the delivery agent
can be adapted to different end user capabilities and to meet different
application requirements.
Keywords: Inter-enterprise collaboration and virtual enterprises; Mid-
dleware standards and systems; Enterprise computing; Security; Non-
repudiation; Fair exchange; Web services
1 Introduction
The increasing use of open, internet-based communications for business-to-
business (B2B) interactions adds urgency to the requirements for security and
regulation to safeguard the interests of participants. These requirements in-
clude: accountability for and acknowledgement of the actions of participants;
and the monitoring of interactions for compliance with business contract. Ac-
countability and acknowledgement can be achieved by the systematic mainte-
nance of an irrefutable audit trail to render B2B interactions non-repudiable.
Regulation entails the monitoring of interactions to ensure that messages ex-
changed are consistent with the business contracts that govern the interaction.
The above requirements are particularly important in high-value B2B re-
lationships, such as in a virtual organisation (VO). In a VO a number of au-
tonomous organisations collaborate to achieve some mutually beneficial goal.
Each organisation requires that their interests are protected in the context of
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the VO. Specifically, that partner organisations comply with contracts governing
the VO; that their own legitimate actions (such as delivery of work, commission
of service) are recognised; and that partner organisations are accountable for
their actions. This implies the recording of activity for audit and the monitor-
ing of activity for compliance with the regulatory regime. Further, to protect
the interests of well-behaved members of a VO, the interaction should be non-
repudiable (no party should be able to deny their participation) and the auditing
and monitoring functions must be fair (misbehaviour should not disadvantage
well-behaved parties).
It is increasingly common to standardise B2B interactions in terms of message-
exchange patterns. The work of the RosettaNet Consortium [1] is a case in point.
RosettaNet define the externally observable aspects of a B2B interaction through
a set of Partner Interface Processes (PIPs). PIPs standardise the XML-based
business messages that should be exchanged between partners to execute some
function (such as order processing). Figure 1 shows the delivery of a business
A B
1. msg
2. ack
3. valid/invalid
4. ack
Figure 1: Business message delivery with acknowledgements
message and associated acknowledgements in such an interaction. Typically,
for each business message, there should be an immediate acknowledgement of
receipt — indicating successful delivery of the message. Eventually, a second
acknowledgement indicates whether the business message is valid (or invalid) in
the context of the given interaction. Finally, the validation message is acknowl-
edged in return.
Validation of the original business message (performed at B) can be arbi-
trarily complex. For example, it may simply involve verification that a message
is syntactically valid and in correct sequence with respect to a single PIP. Al-
ternatively, a message may require validation with respect to more complex
contractual conditions or with respect to local application state. Triggering
validation at the level of business message delivery has the potential to allow
specialization of an application to meet the constraints of different regulatory
regimes. A PIP, or composition of PIPs, may specify the general form of a B2B
process that is then validated at run-time in the context of a specific business
relationship. Web services are increasingly used to enable B2B interactions of
this kind. However, there is currently no systematic support to make the ex-
change of the business message and associated acknowledgements both fair and
non-repudiable. For example, there is no systematic support to prevent a cus-
tomer from denying that they submitted a purchase order and at the same time
to prevent the supplier from denying its receipt.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a flexible frame-
work for fair, non-repudiable message delivery and its implementation using
Web services technologies. The implementation comprises a set of services that
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are invoked at the middleware level and, therefore, enable the Web services
developer to concentrate on business functions. Our middleware renders the
exchange of business messages fair and non-repudiable. Arbitrarily complex,
application-level validation is supported through the registration of message
validators to validate messages upon receipt. The paper describes two fair ex-
change protocols that have been chosen for initial implementation. However, our
framework is sufficiently flexible to adapt to different application requirements
and, in particular, to execute different protocols.
Section 2 provides an overview of the underlying concepts of non-repudiation
and fairness, and of our approach to achieving these properties for an interac-
tion of the type described above. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of
the initial fair exchange protocols chosen. Their implementation is based on a
trusted third party (TTP) delivery agent. The agent can either take on most
of the responsibilities of evidence verification and storage and, thereby, simplify
the tasks for its users; or greater responsibility can be transferred to the users
to reduce the demands on the delivery agent. Section 4 describes the imple-
mentation based on Web service technologies. Section 5 discusses related work.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Basic concepts and approach
In this section we introduce some basic concepts that will be used throughout
the paper. We then provide an overview of the approach taken to render the
interaction described in Section 1 both fair and non-repudiable.
2.1 Basic concepts
Non-repudiation is the inability to subsequently deny an action or event. It is
one of the key properties of secure systems as defined in [2]. In the context
of distributed systems, non-repudiation is applied to the sending and receiving
of messages. For example, for the delivery of a message from A to B : (i) B
may require non-repudiation of origin of the message (NRO) — irrefutable evi-
dence that the message originated at A; and (ii) A may require non-repudiation
of receipt of the message (NRR) — irrefutable evidence that B received the
message
Non-repudiation is usually achieved using public key cryptography. If A
signs a message with their private key, B can confirm the origin of the message
by verifying the signature using A’s public key. Similarly, given B’s signature on
the message, A can confirm receipt by verifying the signature using B’s public
key.
Exchanging non-repudiation evidence is essential to be able to subsequently
demonstrate what happened during an interaction. An additional requirement
is that at the end of the interaction no well-behaved party is disadvantaged. For
example, consider the situation where the sender provides proof of origin but
does not obtain the corresponding proof of receipt. This is unfair because the
receiver can choose to deny receipt of a message. Fairness can be achieved by
executing a fair exchange protocol. Markowitch et al [3] provide the following
definition of fairness: “... The communication channel’s quality being fixed, at
the end of the protocol run, either all involved parties obtain their expected
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items or none (even a part) of the information to be exchanged with respect to
the missing items is received.”.
Most practical fair non-repudiation protocols require the involvement of a
TTP to some extent. The level of intervention can vary depending on the
protocol and the requirements of the end users. Kremer et al [4] identify three
main types of TTP: inline, online and offline. An inline TTP (sometimes called
a delivery agent) is involved in transmission of each protocol message. An
online TTP is involved in each session of a protocol but not in every message
transmission. An offline TTP is involved in a protocol only in case of incorrect
behaviour of a dishonest entity or in case of network failures.
2.2 Overview of approach
To illustrate our approach we take the business interaction described in Section 1
and make it fair and non-repudiable. Figure 2 introduces a delivery agent (DA),
A DA
msg, NRO
NRS
NRR BNRR
Validator
NRV
NRV
validation msg
msg
NRO
ack
Figure 2: Executing a business interaction through a delivery agent
or inline TTP, to the interaction shown in Figure 1. Four types of evidence are
generated: (i) non-repudiation of origin (NRO) that msg originated at A; (ii)
non-repudiation of submission (NRS) to the DA of msg and NRO; (iii) non-
repudiation of receipt (NRR) of msg by B ; (iv) non-repudiation of validation
(NRV ) — valid or otherwise, as determined by validation of msg by B. As
shown, A starts an exchange by sending a message, with proof of origin, to DA.
This is the equivalent of message 1 in Figure 1 with the NRO appended. DA
exchanges msg and NRO for NRR with B (before application-level validation
of msg). Then DA provides NRR to A — equivalent to message 2 in Figure 1.
Subsequently, B performs application-level validation of msg (as in message 3
of Figure 1) and provides NRV to DA. The DA, in turn, provides NRV to A
and provides acknowledgement of NRV to B. Note, the exact sequence of the
exchange will be dictated by the actual protocol used and should not be inferred
from Figure 2.
A BDA
msg msg
A’s Interceptor B’s Interceptor
Figure 3: Interceptor approach
As shown in Figure 3, our approach is to deploy interceptors that act on be-
half of the end users in an interaction. An interceptor has two main functions:
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(i) to protect the interests of the party on whose behalf it acts by executing
appropriate protocols and accessing appropriate services, including TTP ser-
vices; and (ii) to abstract away the detail of the mechanisms used to render an
interaction safe and reliable for its end user. In this case, the mechanism used
is to communicate through a TTP — DA. It is the responsibility of the DA
to ensure fairness and liveness for well-behaved parties in interactions that the
DA supports. Further, the DA’s fairness and liveness guarantees hold for well-
behaved parties in spite of any misbehaviour by any other party involved in an
interaction. Since the cooperation of misbehaving parties cannot be guaranteed,
in extremis the DA will ensure that any disputes that arise can be resolved in
favour of well-behaved parties.
For an interaction of the type described in Section 1, the introduction of
interceptors means that the end users, A and B, experience the message ex-
change shown in Figure 1. However, the exchange that actually takes place is
as shown in Figure 2. That is, as far as possible, A and B are free to concen-
trate on application level concerns while their interaction is rendered fair and
non-repudiable.
From DA’s point of view there is no distinction between A and A’s inter-
ceptor, or B and B ’s interceptor (similarly, for A with respect to B and B with
respect to A). Therefore, we only distinguish between an end user and their in-
terceptor when necessary — for example, when discussing the implementation.
3 Delivery-agent based fair exchange
This section discusses the first two fair exchange protocols we have chosen to
implement. First we provide an overview of the chosen protocols and discuss
the motivation behind the choice. Then we state protocol assumptions and
notation. The section concludes with a detailed description of each protocol.
In addition to a main protocol there are sub-protocols to support exception
handling. Since the delivery agent is trusted, these sub-protocols can be used
for timely, and fair, termination of a protocol despite non-cooperation of one of
the other participants in the main protocol.
3.1 Protocol overview
Coffey and Saidha developed a fair non-repudiation protocol utilising an in-line
TTP [5]. This was later improved by Zhou and Gollman in [6]. The protocols
presented here are derived from the improved protocol. Both protocols include
modifications: (i) to provide A with proof of submission to DA; (ii) to sup-
port the non-repudiation of the extra validation message described in Section 2
(adding 3 protocol steps); and (iii) to support exception handling through exe-
cution of sub-protocols. The first protocol is a further modification to support
light-weight end users. The second protocol uses a light-weight delivery agent
and is closer to the original Coffey and Saidha protocol.
In the first protocol, the delivery agent is responsible for much of the ev-
idence verification and for the long-term storage of evidence for audit. The
end users only need to verify evidence produced by the delivery agent and, in
consequence, only need access to the information necessary to verify a known
third party’s signature and credentials. This means that the end users may only
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require credential management at the level used by the typical Web browser (as
opposed to access to the more comprehensive public key infrastructure required
to verify evidence from all parties with whom they may interact). End user
logging requirements are also reduced. Minimally, they only need to maintain
the information necessary to link an interaction to the evidence held by the
delivery agent (such as a protocol run identifier).
In the second protocol, the responsibilities for evidence verification and long-
term storage are transferred to the end users, reducing the delivery agent re-
sponsibilities. In this case, the delivery agent may discard information after
termination of a protocol run and need only sign the non-repudiation of sub-
mission evidence (as opposed to all non-repudiation tokens seen by the other
participants). A lighter-weight delivery agent inevitably leads to increased di-
rect end-user reliance on supporting public key infrastructure and to increased
end-user responsibility for long-term storage of evidence.
3.2 Assumptions
We make the standard perfect cryptography assumptions [7], including: (i)
that message digests (secure hashes) are one-way, collision resistant; (ii) that it
is computationally infeasible to predict the next bit of a secure pseudo-random
sequence even with complete knowledge of the algorithmic or hardware generator
and of all of the previous bits in the sequence; (iii) that digital signatures cannot
be forged; and (iv) that encrypted data cannot be decrypted except with the
appropriate decryption key. To support the assertion that a key used to sign
evidence was not compromised at time of use, and for audit trail logs, signed
evidence should be time-stamped by a TTP time-stamping service [6]. For
brevity, time-stamping is not shown in protocol descriptions.
The following assumptions are made with respect to well-behaved parties to
a non-repudiable interaction:
• The communication channel between well-behaved parties provides even-
tual message delivery (there is a bounded number of temporary network
and computer related failures).
• Each party has persistent storage for messages. More precisely, well-
behaved parties will ensure that messages are available for as long as is
necessary to meet their obligations to other parties (longer term storage
may be required for their own purposes).
• Well-behaved parties only exchange messages that are well-constructed
with respect to the protocol being executed. For example: messages
exchanged are either tamper-resistant (encrypted), or tampering is de-
tectable and well-behaved parties will cooperate to ensure a well-constructed
message is eventually delivered.
To guarantee fairness, we make the same assumptions with respect to the DA as
in existing fair exchange protocols, namely: (i) that the DA is well-behaved; (ii)
that, given the perfect cryptography assumptions, the DA can detect the mis-
behaviour of other parties; and (iii) that the DA will ensure protocol resolution
in favour of well-behaved parties.
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3.3 Notation
In the protocols, participant A, wishes to send a business message, msg, to
participant B. All communications between A and B take place through delivery
agent DA. Table 1 provides the notation used for basic protocol elements. To
Notation Description
rn secure pseudo-random number
h (x) secure hash of x
id unique protocol run identifier
i, j concatenation of items i and j
P → Q : m P sends m to Q
sigP (x) P ’s digital signature on x
encP (x) encryption of x with P ’s public key
V AL | INV signifies msg validity or invalidity
NV AL signifies msg not validated
Table 1: Notation for protocol elements
simplify protocol descriptions, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that
the signature scheme is recoverable. That is, if necessary, x (and any items
that are concatenated to construct x) may be recovered from sigP (x)1. To
allow verification of rn as a protocol authenticator, it is also assumed that id
contains h (rn). Table 2 defines the non-repudiation evidence exchanged during
Non-repudiation token Description
NRSDA = sigDA (id, A, B) DA’s NRS of initial
protocol message
NROA = sigA (id, A, B, h (msg)) A’s NRO of msg
NRRB = sigB (id, A, B, h (msg)) B ’s NRR of msg
NRVB = sigB (id, V AL | INV ) B ’s NRV of msg
NRODA = sigDA (id, A, B, msg) DA’s NRO of msg
for B
NRRDA = NRODA DA’s NRR of msg
for A
NRVDA = sigDA (id, V AL | INV ) DA’s NRV of msg
NRV ′DA = sigDA (id, NV AL) DA’s substitute
NRV of msg
Table 2: Definition of non-repudiation tokens
a protocol run. DA associates a termination state with each exchange. The state
is SUCCEEDED if the exchange is successfully completed and ABORTED if
the exchange is cancelled.
1If the signature scheme is non-recoverable, then any necessary items are sent with the
associated signature.
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3.4 Fair exchange for light-weight end users
This section first discusses normal execution to successful completion of the
main protocol for light-weight end users. We then present abort and resolve
sub-protocols for exception handling.
Normal protocol execution
Normal execution of the main protocol is shown below, followed by a commen-
tary on each step.
1 A → DA : encDA (msg, rn, NROA)
2 DA → A : NRSDA
3 DA → B : id, A, B, h (msg)
4 B → DA : encDA (NRRB)
5 DA → A : NRRDA
6 DA → B : msg, NRODA
7 B → DA : NRVB
8 DA → B : id, rn
9 DA → A : NRVDA
Step 1: A sends a business message (msg), a secure pseudo-random number
(rn) and its non-repudiation of origin token (NROA) to DA. At this step,
if DA finds that the id included in NROA is not unique, an appropriate
response will be generated to prompt A to restart the protocol with a
newly generated id. Otherwise, the protocol will proceed to step 2. The
rn provided by A is used in step 8 as the acknowledgement of receipt of
B’s NRV token. All items are encrypted to guarantee that B does not
obtain the items before providing non-repudiation of receipt.
Step 2: DA provides proof of submission to A to signal willingness to proceed
with protocol execution. This step may be executed in parallel with step
3.
Step 3: To enable B to construct NRRB: DA sends the id, the participant
identifiers A and B (recovered from NROA) and a hash of msg to B.
Step 4: B responds with NRRB. It is safe for B to send the receipt to DA
before obtaining msg because DA, as TTP, can and will provide msg in
return. NRRB is encrypted to guarantee that A can only obtain the
receipt if the exchange runs to some form of successful completion.
Step 5: DA sends NRRDA to A. This is DA’s receipt for msg and assurance
that it has received and verified NRRB. This step may be executed in
parallel with step 6.
Step 6: DA sends msg and associated NRODA to B.
Step 7: B performs application-level validation of msg. The outcome of this
validation is signed along with id to form NRVB that is sent to DA.
Step 8: rn, hitherto known only to A and DA, is sent to B as acknowledgement
of receipt for NRVB. This step may be executed in parallel with step 9.
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Step 9: DA sendsNRVDA to A— non-repudiation of the outcome of validation
of msg.
At the end of execution of the main protocol, A has acquired the following
evidence: NRSDA, NRRDA and NRVDA — non-repudiation of submission,
receipt and validation of msg. In return, B has acquired: msg, NRODA and rn
— the business message with non-repudiation of origin and acknowledgement
of validation of msg. DA has the complete set of evidence, including: NROA,
NRRB and NRVB.
Fairness is guaranteed because DA controls the release of the evidence to A
and B. Furthermore, DA’s signature on the evidence provided to A and B : (i)
serves as a guarantee that DA has seen, verified and will store the evidence for
future reference; and (ii) reduces the verification work of A and B to that of
verifying the signature and associated credentials of a well-known TTP.
If B does not wish to perform application-level validation of msg, then the
protocol can terminate at step 6. In this case, at step 4, B sends DA both
NRRB and a default NRVB token that confirms the validity of msg. At step
5, DA sends A both NRRDA and NRVDA. At step 6, DA sends rn to B with
msg and NRODA.
On successful completion of the main protocol, DA sets termination state to
SUCCEEDED.
Exception handling
In exceptional circumstances A or B may request that DA terminate the main
protocol before completion. Such requests typically occur because A or B is
concerned about the liveness of protocol execution (whether as a result of the
non-cooperation of a participant or extraneous factors such as network delays).
There are two types of request:
abort: where the requesting party wishes to terminate the protocol as if no
exchange had taken place. That is, neither A nor B receive any useful
information about the exchange.
resolve: where the requesting party seeks DA’s assistance in securing normal
termination. That is, all expected items (or their equivalent) are available
to well-behaved parties.
These requests are, in effect, the statement of a preference for how the exchange
should complete. Irrespective of the type of request, it is the responsibility of DA
to ensure that fairness guarantees hold for all honest parties. Depending on the
progress of the main protocol and whether the exchange termination state has
already been set, DA must determine whether the exchange should terminate
in ABORTED state (no exchange has taken place) or SUCCEEDED state
(exchange has taken place). An exchange can terminate in SUCCEEDED
state if and only if: (i) A is entitled to NRSDA, NRRDA and NRVDA (or an
equivalent substitution); and (ii) B is entitled to msg, rn and NRODA.
DA is empowered to issue the substitute non-repudiation of validation, NRV ′DA,
in place of NRVDA. NRV ′DA is DA’s signed confirmation that B has not vali-
dated msg. Once DA has produced NRV ′DA no validation of msg by B will be
accepted. NRV ′DA is equivalent to invalidation of msg with the supplementary
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information that B did not cooperate in the decision. At first sight, this places
A at a disadvantage, since B can receive msg and simply decide not to cooper-
ate in its validation. However: (i) in any case, B may autonomously decide that
a message is not valid (and such invalidation may be subject to extra-protocol
dispute resolution); and (ii) A obtains evidence of B ’s lack of participation in
validation. Thus, in terms of evidence exchanged, the substitution of NRV ′DA
for NRVDA is fair.
From the above, we observe that fairness is guaranteed to both A and B if:
1. the main protocol completes normally; or
2. B chooses not to engage in the main protocol by not responding to step
3 (up to and including step 3, A has only received NRSDA and B has no
useful information about msg); or
3. the exchange is aborted when the main protocol has progressed no further
than step 4 (at step 4, B sends NRRB to DA but the protocol can still
be aborted because A does not have NRRDA and B is yet to receive msg
or NRODA); or
4. the exchange is completed successfully after execution of step 4 (at step 4,
DA has all the information necessary to complete the exchange; after exe-
cution of step 5, DA must guarantee that all expected items are available
to both A and B).
The pivotal point in the main protocol is step 4. Before step 4, DA can only
respond to either type of termination request by aborting the exchange. Upon
execution of step 4, DA has rn, msg, NROA and NRRB but is yet to complete
the release of information to either A or B. Thus, at this point, they can satisfy
whichever type of termination request they receive first. Once DA releases
critical information in step 5, they must respond to a termination request by
successfully resolving the exchange.
A request from an end user, U ∈ {A, B}, to DA to abort an exchange results
in execution of the following abort sub-protocol:
1 U → DA : sigU (sid, ABORT, id)
if ABORTED
or (not SUCCEEDED and lastStep < 5) then:
2.1 DA → U : sigDA (sid, ABORTED, id)
else if lastStep < 7 then:
2.2 DA → U : SUCCDA, resU , NRV ′DA
else:
2.3 DA → U : SUCCDA, resU , NRVDA
where:
sid = unique sub-protocol identifier
SUCCDA = sigDA (sid, SUCCEEDED)
resA = NRSDA, NRRDA
resB = rn, msg, NRODA
In step 1, U submits a signed request to abort the exchange identified by
id. DA then checks the state of the exchange. If termination state is not
10
already SUCCEEDED and the main protocol has not progressed beyond step
4 (lastStep < 5), then DA sets termination state to ABORTED. DA provides
U with non-repudiation of aborted exchange in step 2.1. If the exchange cannot
be aborted, DA checks whether the main protocol has progressed beyond step
6. If not, then step 2.2 above is executed to complete a successful exchange
with substitute NRV ′DA. Otherwise step 2.3 is executed to complete successful
exchange of the evidence that would have been provided during normal execu-
tion. As shown above, resU is the resolution evidence provided to A or B, as
appropriate. If either step 2.2 or 2.3 is executed, DA sets termination state to
SUCCEEDED.
The corresponding resolve sub-protocol is:
1 U → DA : sigU (sid, RESOLV E, id)
if ABORTED or lastStep < 4 then:
2.1 DA → U : sigDA (sid, ABORTED, id)
else if lastStep < 7 then:
2.2 DA → U : SUCCDA, resU , NRV ′DA
2.3 DA → U : SUCCDA, resU , NRVDA
Apart from the signed request that initiates the resolve sub-protocol, the
only significant difference to the abort sub-protocol is that execution of step 2.1
is triggered if either termination state is ABORTED or the main protocol has
not progressed beyond step 3.
Once the termination state of an exchange has been set (whether after exe-
cution of the main protocol or one of the above sub-protocols), DA will forever
respond in the same way to any subsequent request to abort or resolve the iden-
tified exchange (with appropriate abort token or resolution evidence). DA also
responds in the same way to any subsequent message of the main protocol. That
is, once the termination state has been set, DA suspends the main protocol at
lastStep.
Termination may also be triggered by the a priori indication of deadlines for
the acknowledgements provided in the main protocol (NRS, NRR and NRV). In
this case, in step 1 of the main protocol A can indicate deadline(s) for delivery
that they wish to be observed (on a best effort basis). During protocol execution,
DA determines locally whether a delivery deadline is achievable. If not, DA
will pro-actively terminate the exchange and issue appropriate abort or resolve
tokens to A and B depending on the state of the main protocol at the time of
termination.
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3.5 Fair exchange with light-weight delivery agent
Normal protocol execution
The protocol for fair exchange with light-weight DA is:
1 A → DA : encDA (msg, rn, NROA)
2 DA → A : NRSDA
3 DA → B : id, A, B, h (msg)
4 B → DA : encDA (NRRB)
5 DA → A : NRRB
6 DA → B : msg, NROA
7 B → DA : NRVB
8 DA → B : id, rn
9 DA → A : NRVB
This protocol is closer to the Coffey-Saidha protocol with the addition of steps
7 to 9 for NRV of msg. The difference between this protocol and the light-
weight end user protocol is that A and B are now responsible for verification of
each other’s evidence and for its long-term storage. Thus, in steps 5, 6 and 9,
DA relays the tokens provided by A and B rather than generating new signed
tokens.
Exception handling
The abort and resolve sub-protocols are basically as defined in Section 3.4 except
that the resolution evidence provided in steps 2.2 and 2.3 is now:
resA = NRSDA, NRRB
resB = rn, msg, NROA
For successful termination before step 7, the DA provides NRV ′DA (as described
in Section 3.4). For successful termination after step 6, DA provides NRVB (as
opposed to NRVDA). The abort token is identical to that defined in Section 3.4.
3.6 Fault tolerance in fair exchange
A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an
honest participant even if the participant’s node experiences failures of the as-
sumed type. In other words, an honest user does not suffer a loss of fairness
because of their node failure. This is not the case with most of the fair exchange
protocols studied in the literature, including the ones presented here. Ezhilchel-
van and Shrivastava [8] describe various approaches to preserving fairness in
the presence of node crashes and recovery; application of these to the protocols
presented here is left as a direction for future work.
4 Implementation based on Web services
In this section we present the Web services based implementation of a framework
for non-repudiation protocol execution (WS-NRExchange). First we provide an
overview of Web services and the standards used to support WS-NRExchange.
Then we provide a high-level view of a WS-NRExchange based non-repudiable
12
interaction. Section 4.3 describes the generic interface to protocol execution and
the associated message schema that underpin WS-NRExchange.
The combination of an interceptor based approach and a generic interface
to protocol execution allows the infrastructure to adapt to different application
requirements, including the execution of different protocols, without disturbing
application-level logic. For example, the infrastructure presented here could be
used to execute protocols with inline, online or offline TTP.
DSS XKMS
XML Signature
XML Encryption
WS-NRExchange
SOAP
RM
WS-Security
Figure 4: WS-NRExchange and Web service standards
To place the following discussion in context, Figure 4 shows how various
XML and Web service standards support WS-NRExchange.
4.1 Overview of Web services and supporting standards
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Figure 5: WS-NRExchange architecture
A Web service can be described, published, located and invoked over the
Web. Web services are based on open standards and are designed to inter-
operate independent of implementation platform. Web services typically com-
municate using the SOAP messaging protocol [9]. A SOAP message is an XML
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document that comprises a message envelope with a header and a body. The
header contains message processing information. The body contains the appli-
cation payload. The interface that a Web service exposes, in terms of messages
that can be processed and operations that can be invoked, can be described
using the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) [10] .
The WS-Security standard [11] covers the creation of self-protecting mes-
sages for Web services. WS-Security applies XML technologies, such as XML
Signature [12] and XML Encryption [13], to SOAP messages. XML Signature
specifies how to attach signatures, and related information, to XML documents,
or parts of documents, and related material. XML Encryption is the correspond-
ing standard for encryption.
Digital Signature Service (DSS) and XML Key Management Specification
(XKMS) are higher level specifications that use WS-Security. DSS specifies a
service for the verification and the application of signatures to XML; and for
trusted time-stamping of signed information. XKMS concerns public key life-
cycle management. It specifies how to register, locate, verify and revoke the
digital credentials that are associated with public keys. XKMS and DSS may
be offered as TTP services to support secure Web service interactions, thereby
reducing the security infrastructure requirements of users. Organisations may
also provide a sub-set of the services in-house as part of their own security
infrastructure. For example, an in-house DSS service can be used to apply
corporate signatures to XML messages.
Reliable messaging (RM) specifies the message content, protocols and per-
sistence requirements necessary for Web services to implement various forms of
reliable message delivery. We require at least once message delivery between
well-behaved parties. Currently, there are competing standards proposed for
Web service reliable messaging: WS-Reliability [14] and WS-ReliableMessaging
[15]. There is overlap between the two proposals and WS-NRExchange can
adapt to both.
Our contribution is to provide the NRExchange Web service that uses the
standards outlined above.
4.2 WS-NRExchange based interaction
Figure 5 shows the interactions between the various components and services
that make up our implementation. DA, A and B each provide an NRExchange
Web service that manages their participation in non-repudiation protocols. Each
Web service exposes the same interface for protocol execution. At A and B this
service is deployed as an interceptor that mediates Web service interactions that
require non-repudiation. This interceptor may be co-located with the local ap-
plication that uses it or may, for example, be part of a corporate firewall service.
The end-users, A and B, may themselves be Web services or Web service clients
or both. The NRExchange services access additional local services for signing
evidence, message persistence and application-level validation. The signing ser-
vice is required to apply signatures to the parts of messages that have not already
been signed2 (as dictated by the protocol being executed). This service may be
an implementation of DSS or some other mechanism for obtaining private keys
2It is possible for signatures to have been applied at the application level, in which case
the NRExchange service does not need to countersign.
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to apply signatures as defined by WS-Security. Persistence is required to meet
fault tolerance requirements and also for audit. The NRExchange services also
access trusted time-stamping services and public key management services (for
example, DSS and XKMS services provided by third parties). For protocols
that use an inline TTP, trusted time-stamps may optionally be applied by the
DA Web service.
As described in Section 4.3, a WSDL interface has been defined for the inter-
action between NRExchange services. The SOAP messages exchanged comply
with the WS-Security specification.
The NRExchange Web service also provides a local interface to allow regis-
tration of application-specific listeners for message validation and other events.
A message validation listener may trigger arbitrarily complex validation of a
business message. If no validation listener is registered, then the NRExchange
service assumes that a message is valid with respect to business contract. Mes-
sages that are found to be invalid with respect to contract are logged but are
not passed to the target application for processing. Registration of event listen-
ers allows notification of protocol-related events. For example, an application
can register to receive notification of zero or more of the acknowledgements
generated by the protocols described in Section 3.
4.3 Generic NRExchange interface and message schema
Figure 6 is an extract of the WSDL of an NRExchange Web service that shows
the operations that are exposed to other NRExchange services for protocol ex-
ecution.
<wsdl:portType name="NRExchange">
<operation name="processMessage">
<input message="ProtocolMessage"/>
</operation>
<operation name="processRequest">
<input message="ProtocolMessage"/>
<output message="ProtocolMessage"/>
</operation>
<operation name="abort">
<input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/>
</operation>
<operation name="resolve">
<input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/>
</operation>
<wsdl:operation name="getProtocolState">
<input message="GetProtocolStateMessage"/>
</operation>
<wsdl:operation name="setProtocolState">
<input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/>
</operation>
</wsdl:portType>
Figure 6: Extract of NRExchange WSDL
NRExchange services use the processMessage operation to exchange non-repudiation
protocol messages with each other. The sender provides a protocol message for
the receiver to process according to a specified non-repudiation protocol. Mes-
sage elements are defined in a related XML Schema. The schema is sufficiently
general and extensible for the processMessage operation to be used to execute any
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protocol that participant services support. The processRequest convenience op-
eration allows send and receipt of protocol messages as request/response pairs.
The abort and resolve operations are for pro-active termination (see Sec-
tion 3.4). These operations are typically used by a DA to inform another par-
ticipant service that an identified exchange has been aborted or resolved with the
given termination state. Invocation of these operations may result in execution
of a new sub-protocol using the protocol execution operations.
The getProtocolState operation is a request for information concerning the
known state of a protocol run as viewed by the service on which the operation
is invoked. This operation may lead to execution of a state request sub-protocol
to determine how much of the current state should be revealed to the invokee.
The protocol state may be provided during execution of this sub-protocol or
by invocation of the setProtocolState operation on the service that originally
invoked the getProtocolState operation.
The SOAP binding for the NRExchange service specifies two types of mes-
sage:
1. protocol messages that are exchanged during execution of a main protocol
or of related sub-protocols using processMessage and, optionally, processRequest;
and
2. protocol state (housekeeping) messages that convey information about the
state of an identified protocol run or request update about protocol state
(exchanged using abort, resolve, getProtocolState and setProtocolState).
Both types of message use a WS-Security header to carry security tokens such as:
signatures over evidence; time-stamps; credential and key information; security
context and access control information.
<soapenv:Envelope>
<soapenv:Header>
<wsse:Security />
<nrex:NRExchangeProtocol name runId
messageNumber purpose? runSequence? id?>
<nrex:Acknowledgement />*
<nrex:AcknowledgementsRequired />?
<nrex:Participant />*
<nrex:Receipt />*
<nrex:ReceiptsRequired />?
<nrex:RelatedRun />*
<nrex:RandomDigest />*
(<nrex:RunIdGenerator runId baseURI?>
(<nrex:RandomDigest algorithm value>
<RandomNumber />?
<InputURI />*
</nrex:RandomDigest>)?
</nrex:RunIdGenerator>)?
</nrex:NRExchangeProtocol>
</soapenv:Header>
<soapenv:Body />?
</soapenv:Envelope>
Key:
? = 0 or 1 occurrences
* = 0 or n occurrences
Figure 7: General form of ProtocolMessage
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As shown in Figure 7, protocol messages must have a NRExchangeProtocol
header. This is an extensible container for non-repudiation protocol data items
that are defined in the NRExchange XML schema or may be defined in deriva-
tions of that schema or in schemas that are specific to a given non-repudiation
protocol. The NRExchange schema specifies that any NRExchangeProtocol
header must have protocol name, runId and messageNumber attributes. The
protocol name is a URI that serves to uniquely identify the protocol, or sub-
protocol, being executed and may also provide access to protocol documentation
including schema that specialise the NRExchange schema. The runId is a unique
identifier that is normally generated from some base URI and a random digest
(a hash of a secure pseudo-random number and other associated input). The
inputs to runId generation can be specified using a RunIdGenerator element.
The messageNumber is a positive, non-zero double value that corresponds to
the step of the protocol being executed. Depending on the protocol being exe-
cuted or the step of the protocol, the following optional items may be included
in the NRExchangeProtocol header: a run sequence number; the purpose of
the protocol message (NRR, NRO etc.); the participants in the protocol; the
runIds of any related protocol or sub-protocol runs; and information related to
acknowledgements and receipts required. The message body, if present, contains
the application data originally intended to be conveyed from sender to receiver
as the body of the business message. Section 4.4 provides examples of messages
exchanged during execution of the protocol described in Section 3.4.
Housekeeping messages do not have an NRExchangeProtocol header. They
carry protocol state or state request information intended for another NREx-
change service in the message body. The general form of a protocol state mes-
<soapenv:Envelope>
<soapenv:Header>
<wsse:Security />
</soapenv:Header>
<soapenv:Body>
<nrex:ProtocolState name runId />
</soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
Figure 8: General form of ProtocolStateMessage
sage is shown in Figure 8. In addition to identifying the protocol and run to
which a message relates, a ProtocolState element may include information such
as: the protocol run status; if terminated, the termination state; and the mes-
sage numbers of any messages seen by the recipient. Protocol messages may
be provided as attachments to a protocol state message. Figure 9 presents the
<soapenv:Envelope>
<soapenv:Header>
<wsse:Security />
</soapenv:Header>
<soapenv:Body>
<nrex:ProtocolStateRequest name runId />
</soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
Figure 9: General form of GetProtocolStateMessage
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general form of a message requesting information on the state of a protocol run.
The ProtocolStateRequest element again identifies the protocol name and run
to which it relates. In addition, the element may identify messages seen by the
sender and may include a list of the protocol messages that the sender wishes
to receive as attachments to any response. Housekeeping messages may result
in execution of a sub-protocol to confirm a participant’s entitlement to infor-
mation. Also, security tokens included in the WS-Security header may serve to
assert entitlement to information.
4.4 Example protocol messages
This section uses a purchase order as a simple example of the type of business
message discussed in Section 1. We show a subset of business message con-
tent and the most significant annotations to the message for non-repudiation
protocol execution. Timestamps are omitted and so is encryption. It should
be noted that the specific confidentiality requirement for message 1.0 — that
content be kept secret from the ultimate receiver — can be met using a variety
of mechanisms. In Section 3.4, the requirement is expressed by the use of public
cryptography, which is just one of the mechanisms available. The actual mech-
anism used is not relevant to the annotation of a business message described
here.
<SOAP:Envelope>
<SOAP:Header>
...
</SOAP:Header>
<SOAP:Body>
<po:PurchaseOrder>
<Quantity>1000000</Quantity>
<itemID>234233</itemID>
</po:PurchaseOrder>
...
</SOAP:Body>
</SOAP:Envelope>
Figure 10: Example SOAP purchase order
Figure 10 represents a purchase order message in an application without
non-repudiation. The message is deliberately kept simple. In practice, business
messages may be quite complex and include numerous header and body elements
along with mixed media attachments and references to external information.
Given the WS-NRExchange infrastructure described in Section 4.2, it is possible
to ensure that fair exchange can be applied to messages regardless of their
content, attachments or references.
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<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Header>
<!-- WS-Security header -->
<wsse:Security soap:actor="..." soap:mustUnderstand="1">
<!-- sender certificate -->
<wsse:BinaryToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3">
<!-- token value -->
</wsse:BinaryToken>
<ds:Signature>
<ds:SignedInfo>
<!-- reference to nrex_header -->
<ds:Reference URI="#nrex_header">
<ds:Transforms>
<!-- any transforms -->
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="AlgorithmName"/>
<ds:DigestValue>FallRGr8/...</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<!-- reference to body -->
<ds:Reference URI="#message_body">
<ds:Transforms>...</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="..."/>
<ds:DigestValue>tribUt4//Peel...</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>lsPiZkngCb4uDi/BsPear...</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
<!-- other security tokens -->
</wsse:Security>
<!-- WS-NRExchange header -->
<nrex:NRExchangeProtocol
xmlns:nrex="http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/ws/nrex/v1"
name="http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/ws/nrex/protocols/coffsaid-lwuser/main"
runId="BL8jdK12.."
messageNumber="1.0" purpose="nrex.purpose.NRO"
soap:actor="..." soap:mustUnderstand="1" id="nrex_header">
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.TTP">
http://www.ttp.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.SENDER">
http://www.purchaser.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.RECEIVER">
http://www.supplier.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:RunIdGenerator runId="BL8jdK12..">
<nrex:RandomDigest
algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha-256"
value="BL8jdK12..">
<nrex:RandomNumber>eUr0TapAS04...</nrex:RandomNumber>
</nrex:RandomDigest>
</nrex:RunIdGenerator>
<nrex:ReceiptsRequired>
<nrex:ReceiptSpecification URI="#nrex_header"/>
<nrex:ReceiptSpecification URI="#message_body"/>
</nrex:ReceiptsRequired>
<nrex:AcknowledgmentsRequired>
<nrex:AckSpecification type="nr.ack.TTP"/>
<nrex:AckSpecification type="nr.ack.RECEIVER"/>
<nrex:AckSpecification type="nr.ack.VALIDITOR"
expires="2005-02-28T17:00:00Z"/>
</nrex:AcknowledgmentsRequired>
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</nrex:NRExchangeProtocol>
<!-- other soap header elements -->
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body Id="message_body">
<po:PurchaseOrder>
<Quantity>1000000</Quantity>
<itemID>234233</itemID>
</po:PurchaseOrder>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Figure 11: Example of Coffey-Saidha protocol message 1.0
As shown in Figure 11, a WS-Security header and a NRExchangeProtocol
header are added to the purchase order message to generate a protocol mes-
sage suitable for submission to a DA. The WS-Security header includes signa-
ture blocks that reference the message body (the application-level data) and
the NRExchangeProtocol header (the protocol meta-information). The meta-
information identifies the protocol name, protocol run, message with the run,
message purpose (NRO in this case), participants etc. The RunIdGenerator
block specifies how the protocol runId was generated (including any base URI
and random number used as input). The ReceiptsRequired block identifies all
the message parts for which a receipt is required.
On receipt of message 1.0, the DA responds with message 2.0 shown in Fig-
ure 12. As with message 1.0, message 2.0 includes a WS-Security header and
a NRExchangeProtocol header. The WS-Security header includes a signature
over the whole of the NRExchangeProtocol header. The NRExchangeProtocol
header again identifies the purpose of the message (non-repudiation of submis-
sion) and includes an acknowledgement and a receipt. Both acknowledgement
and receipt reference message 1.0. In addition, the receipt includes a digest of
the NRExchangeProtocol header from message 1.0 in order to cryptographically
link both messages.
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<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Header>
<!-- WS-Security header -->
<wsse:Security soap:actor="..." soap:mustUnderstand="1">
<!-- sender certificate -->
<wsse:BinaryToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3">
<!-- token value -->
</wsse:BinaryToken>
<!-- signature on nrexchange header -->
<ds:Signature>
<ds:SignedInfo>
<!-- xml signature info -->
<ds:Reference URI="#nrex_header">
<ds:Transforms>
<!-- any transforms -->
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="AlgorithmName"/>
<ds:DigestValue>888TUpMM...</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>lsPiZkngCb4uDi/BsPear...</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
<!-- other security tokens -->
</wsse:Security>
<!-- WS-NRExchange header -->
<nrex:NRExchangeProtocol
xmlns:nrex="http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/ws/nrex/v1"
name="http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/ws/nrex/protocols/coffsaid-lwuser/main"
runId="BL8jdK12.."
messageNumber="2.0" purpose="nrex.purpose.NRS"
soap:actor="..." soap:mustUnderstand="1" id="nrex_header">
<nrex:Acknowledgement Type="nrex.ack.TTP" ForMessage="1.0"/>
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.TTP">
http://www.ttp.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.SENDER">
http://www.purchaser.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:Participant role="nrex.role.RECEIVER">
http://www.supplier.com/
</nrex:Participant>
<nrex:Receipt runId="BL8jdK12..." forMessage="1.0">
<ds:Reference URI="#nrex_header">
<ds:Transforms>...</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="..."/>
<ds:DigestValue>FallRGr8/...</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</nrex:Receipt>
</nrex:NRExchangeProtocol>
<!-- other soap header elements -->
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body/>
</soap:Envelope>
Figure 12: Example of Coffey-Saidha protocol message 2.0
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5 Related work
In our earlier work [16] we described how component middleware (such as J2EE
application server) can be enhanced to support non-repudiation. The work
presented in this paper is a significant extension to provide fair, validated, non-
repudiable message delivery in the sort of asynchronous and long-running inter-
actions that Web services are intended to support.
The Universal Postal Union has proposed the Global Electronic Postmark
[17] (EPM) standard. This is a TTP service for generation, verification, time-
stamping and storage of non-repudiation evidence. It does not provide support
for the fair exchange of evidence.
Wichert et al [18] represents an early implementation of a non-repudiation
service that uses filters in CORBA to provide non-repudiable invocation on a
remote object. However, their approach was asymmetric — the client provides
the server with non-repudiation of origin of a request but there is no exchange
to provide corresponding evidence to the client.
Various companies are beginning to offer XML firewall solutions that perform
various security functions such as signing, encryption and verification of crypto-
graphic information. Notably, DataPower [19] offer XML processing in hardware
that can apply cryptography to XML documents at “wire-speed”. Verisign [20]
offer an organisational gateway service to secure SOAP-based message exchange.
Earlier, Lee et al [21] proposed an interceptor-based solution that provided sim-
ilar facilities. All of these approaches can offer non-repudiation of origin by
applying signatures to outgoing messages. They are also capable of verifying
signatures and security tokens attached to incoming messages. They are es-
sentially providing a Wichert-type service for SOAP messaging. They do not
provide systematic non-repudiation of receipt and there is no support for fair
exchange. Neither is there support for systematic binding of non-repudiation
evidence to application-level message validation. The NRExchange service we
have presented could make use of these solutions for its basic cryptographic and
verification services.
There has been much work on fair exchange and fair non-repudiation, and on
the formal verification of protocols. Kremer et al [4] summarise the state of the
art and provide a useful classification of protocols according to types of fairness
and the role of TTPs in protocols. There have also been contributions on the
transformation of fair exchange to meet fault tolerance requirements [22, 8].
This body of work can be brought to bear on the choice of protocols that the
NRExchange services use to meet application requirements.
The FIDES system [23] provides services, including TTP services, and an
associated application for fair exchange of documents. Application clients sub-
mit documents to the FIDES system for fair exchange with partners who also
have a FIDES client for verifying and receipting documents received. In effect
FIDES offers a standalone service for fair exchange. Such a system could be
built on our NRExchange middleware. Similarly, if the FIDES system were
to expose appropriate service interfaces and if their protocol execution engines
could be instrumented to trigger application-level validation, the NRExchange
service could be implemented using FIDES services. Without such interfaces, it
appears difficult to adapt the FIDES approach to arbitrary service interactions.
Apart from FIDES, we know of no other work on service-based implementation
of fair exchange.
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With respect to application-level validation of business messages, the work
of Minsky et al on Law Governed Interaction (LGI) [24] represents one of the
earliest attempts to provide coordination between autonomous organisations.
Trusted agents act as mediators that comply with a global policy. LGI does
not address systematic non-repudiation, but does support automatic validation
techniques. This is similar to work by colleagues [25] that aims to automate,
as far as possible, the derivation and verification of the validation process from
business contracts.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have developed an approach and a reference implementation
to support fair non-repudiable interactions. We showed how an existing de-
livery agent based protocol could be augmented to render a common business
message exchange non-repudiable. This involved the addition of extra steps for
message validation. We then described how the protocol could be modified to
facilitate a more light-weight delivery agent. In Section 4 we described our Web
services based implementation. This involved a general overview of the architec-
ture showing how our services interact with existing Web service standards and
services. We then described our Web services interface to protocol execution.
Future work will provide end-to-end fair non-repudiation of application-level
request/response message exchange. Essentially, the message delivery primitive
will be used to provide fair exchange of both the request and the response mes-
sage along with non-repudiation of the correlation between the application-level
messages. This will be similar to the non-repudiable service invocation described
in [16] but will apply in the Web services context and will operate for different
request/response semantics (for example: asynchronous, deferred synchronous
and synchronous). We also intend to use the NRExchange infrastructure to
provide Web services based non-repudiable information sharing [26].
Our implementation operates a layer above reliable messaging. However,
there is duplication of effort between fair exchange and reliable messaging both
in terms of acknowledgements generated and message persistence. We intend to
investigate tighter integration of the two services. Our approach will be mod-
ular and configurable. Essentially, either the fair exchange service will provide
reliable messaging directly (for greater performance) or, as now, it will rely on
an existing standards-based implementation to provide a reliable channel.
We also intend to investigate systematic support for protocol development
from verification and modelling through a derived implementation to deploy-
ment as part of the infrastructure described in this paper.
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